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Overview 
Non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels are used extensively in industrial activities 
and transportation. The carbon emissions generated from those markets are the source of a 
number of negative externalities such as air pollution, climate change, global warming, and 
the degradation of ecosystems and natural environments.  
  To alleviate such externalities societies are usually left with one of two choices. 
Governments may choose to impose carbon taxes on consumers and heavy-emitting 
industries. This is effectively a Pigovian tax regulation, which seeks to make market 
participants internalize the cost of externalities into their private costs in the hope that the 
net increase in the cost reduces the size of the externality. As an alternative, governments 
may use the price mechanism of markets rather than a direct tax. This could be called a 
Coasian approach to curbing the externality. It usually involves creating property rights 
over the resource that is being polluted (e.g. air or water) and trading rights to access it. A 
typical example might be the creation of pollution units such as emission permits or carbon 
allowances. Through the trading of permits among consumers, market forces determine 
the price of carbon which facilitates an efficient reduction of emissions. 
  In this paper, we debate the relative merits and problems of both approaches - a Coasian 
market solution and a Pigovian tax regulation. We consider some concrete applications of 
both theoretical concepts in doing so.  
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Modeling the Externalities 
It is constructive to begin by first illustrating the concept of a negative externality and the 
source of the resultant inefficiency in a market. We take the petroleum market as a model. 
 
FIGURE 1: THE INEFFICIENCIES ASSOCIATED WITH NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Consider Figure 1. The marginal social benefit curve, denoted MSB, represents demand for 
petroleum. The supply curve for petroleum producers is represented by the marginal 
private cost curve, MC. For every marginal litre of petroleum produced and consumed, an 
additional external cost is borne by the society. This is represented by the marginal social 
cost, MSC. The marginal external cost borne by members of this society as a result of the 
petroleum market is derived from the difference between MSC and MC i.e. P2 – P1. Since the 
market equilibrium is at the intersection of P1 and Q1, it is inefficient because MSC exceeds 
MSB. This creates a deadweight loss (area A). Conversely, an efficient market outcome is 
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characterized by MSB offsetting MSC in equilibrium. By this definition, the optimal 
quantity of petroleum that should be produced and consumed by society is hence QE. 
 
The Pigovian Tax Regulation 
As an example of how a Pigovian tax intervention would resolve such an externality, let us 
consider the eco tax implemented by Germany since 1999. We are still using the petroleum 
market as a backdrop, because the eco tax targets fuel and electricity (Büchs, Duwe & 
Bardsley, 2009). The figure below illustrates how the eco tax works. 
 
FIGURE 2: HOW THE GERMAN ECO TAX WORKS 
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Since the German government wants to influence consumers to curb carbon expenditure, it 
sets the tax rate equal to the marginal external cost borne by consumers. The MC plus the 
tax to be paid will thus determine the market supply curve, which is also the MSC. When 
firms produce petroleum at QE, there is efficiency because MSC and MSB are equalized. 
Consequently, the market price will be set at PE, and the government collects the tax 
revenue equivalent to the shaded area in Figure 2. 
  Proponents of the Pigovian tax solution claim that the tax revenue generated can be 
redistributed to society or used to reduce other forms of taxation. This was the case for 
Germany’s eco tax, where part of the tax revenue was applied towards reducing social 
security contributions for senior-citizen pensions (Büchs, Duwe & Bardsley, 2009). 
  However, the Pigovian approach requires the regulator to possess a high degree of 
information on the private and social costs in the market. This is potentially problematic in 
an environment with any degree of uncertainty about the exact amount and nature of the 
external costs generated by market activity. Furthermore, MSC and MSB must always be 
equated after the tax has been imposed for it to be an efficient intervention. This implies a 
dynamic tax rate that varies with carbon emission levels at different times. 
  If the tax rate is higher than the actual external costs borne by consumers, market 
participants may object to it. Conversely, if the tax is lower than actual external costs, it 
would be ineffective in removing the deadweight loss in the market resulting from the 
emissions externality. The tax is also potentially regressive because poor households 
usually spend larger proportions of their income on energy than rich households. Thus, an 
increase in prices for fuel would be asymmetrically burdensome for the poor. 
  Furthermore, as demand for petroleum has rather low price elasticity, the potential of 
emission reduction may also be limited by the fact that consumers are often indifferent 
towards the price changes of essential goods such as fuel. Thus, although tax revenue may 
be generated in the short run, the long run objective of meeting target levels of emission 
reduction may not necessarily materialize with a Pigovian tax solution. 
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The Coasian Market Solution 
A Coasian market solution involves the creation of property rights to enable the market 
mechanism to endogenously develop a price. In the case of the petroleum market the 
establishment of a carbon credit trading market running in parallel is enabled by creating 
property rights over the atmosphere in the sense that a permit needs to be purchased to 
emit a fixed amount of carbon. Through establishing property rights, each member of the 
market is allotted or purchases a certain amount of credits to spend on pollution, and they 
are then able to trade those units with other participants in the carbon market. The 
regulator can fix or cap the aggregate number of such permits in circulation thereby 
controlling the total level of pollution. 
  The Coasian solution relies on rational consumers and producers pursuing utility 
maximization and cost minimization objectives. Market participants seek gains from trade 
and this acts as an incentive for them to change their behavior, eventually reducing 
externalities. However, given self-interested rational market participants, these gains from 
trade must be large enough to entice them to change their behavior i.e. the opportunity 
cost of going green must be lesser than the potential gains. 
  We shall use the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which was established under the 
Kyoto Protocol, to explain the statement above. Under the CDM, developed countries 
facilitate greenhouse gas reductions by financing emission-reduction projects in 
developing countries. In return, developing countries earn certified emission reduction 
(CER) credits, which are traded and sold in dealings with developed countries (Metcalfe & 
Vorhies, 2010). From a rational, utility-maximizing, point of view, the gains from trading 
these CERs should exceed the costs of implementing the CDM in order to effectively induce 
consumers to reduce carbon usage. 
  The property rights attached to pollution units include specifications of the laws of 
liabilities for damages associated with externalities. Randall (1972) stated that the full-
liability rule pertaining to the Coase theorem implies that externalities should not be 
formed if the affected parties find them objectionable. Hence, acting parties must 
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compensate affected parties. In other words, full liability emerges from well-designed and 
well-enforced property rights to an asset. 
  Here are some examples to demonstrate the aforementioned statement. Cap-and-trade 
schemes such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and personal carbon allowance scheme 
function on the premise of placing a cap on carbon emissions, while allocating permits and 
allowances to consumers to spend within the cap. People holding left-over 
permits/allowances can thus sell them to heavy polluters at a premium. Note that full-
liability is attached to each permit or unit of allowance. Consequently, normal market 
forces i.e. demand and supply will determine the price of each unit of carbon. As long as the 
full-liability rule is adhered to, the market will achieve an efficient equilibrium. Figure 3 
illustrates the quantity of reduction in emission externalities that should be attained in 
order to achieve the efficient equilibrium. 
 
FIGURE 3: THE EFFICIENT REDUCTION OF EMISSION EXTERNALITIES
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  In the short run, the change in liability rules and the creation of a Coasian market solution 
will reduce carbon emissions and create opportunities for new markets. These new markets 
may include solar and hybrid technology, which will be needed by consumers to reduce 
their emission levels. Furthermore, it will be possible to create new financial markets to 
assist in environmental preservation. The CDM helped create a private-sector finance 
market for environmental projects (Metcalfe & Vorhies, 2010). 
  In the long run, a full-liability rule will create a higher abatement of externalities, and a 
reallocation of resources to control emissions. This encourages innovation to create low 
emission-production processes, which in turn facilitates the redistribution of income to 
environmental innovation sectors as well as lead to job creation. Politics and bureaucracy 
play a significant role in the successful implementation of a Coasian market solution. There 
is a danger, though, of regulatory capture by firms adversely affected by the policy 
outcomes entailing a Coasian solution. Hence, politicians should avoid succumbing to their 
own self interests.   
  The Coase theorem emphasizes the significant role of transaction costs. Where these are 
substantial, the Coasian solution does not necessarily result in efficient outcomes. Steep 
transaction costs will bar the achievement of solutions that are demonstrably better than 
the status quo. Such status quo situations can be alleviated, however, if perfect competition 
remains in all the industries including the transaction industry. This ensures that a Pareto-
efficient solution emerges i.e. all market participants shall be made better off. In order to 
realize this outcome, it is imperative that market participants have full information on 
carbon prices and that free entry is guaranteed to all firms. The production output of each 
firm should also be similar, and any individual firm should not be able to influence the 
market price of carbon.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
We conclude with the following observations on these two broad perspectives on 
intervention. The Pigovian tax regulation has the advantage of simplicity and cost security, 
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but the high informational requirements, the lack of environmental certainty and the low 
price elasticity of fuel demand lessen the efficacy of this approach in curbing emissions. 
Furthermore, taxes are often an issue of contention for industries, consumers, and the 
political scene.  
  The Coasian market solution, on the other hand, assigns property rights to participants 
and creates a market for emissions trading as well as opportunities for green technology 
markets. The challenge is to reduce the high level of transaction costs for this approach. If 
transaction costs are successfully reduced, and proper institutions are in place to enforce 
those property rights, the Coasian market solution, in our view, would be a more attractive 
approach for reducing carbon emissions.  
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